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ABSTRACT 
 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM EPA’S CLIMATE LEADERS PROGRAM: 
AN EVALUATION TO FORTIFY VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL INITIATIVES 
 
Author: Vivian Futran 
 
Advisor: Elaine Wright 
 
A voluntary environmental program (VEP) called Climate Leaders was recently 
cancelled by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  To find out why and gather 
lessons learned, the program was examined using a three-pronged approach: 1) a meta-
analysis of program evaluation theory literature, 2) a review of guides and external reports on 
Climate Leaders, and 3) interviews with former program participants and implementers.  
Findings reveal that environmental protection is best achieved by combining regulation with 
voluntary methods as they complement and buttress each other.  Recommendations were 
compiled to help future VEPs minimize wasted resources and improve environmental 
conditions.  These recommendations were vetted by industry, and ultimately contribute to a 
comprehensive “guiding framework” for the design, implementation, and evaluation of 
VEPs.  Existing VEP models and evaluative tools still lack the perspective of several key 
disciplines, so additional program evaluations are necessary to capture all of the primary 
characteristics correlated with program success and complete the guiding framework. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Overview 
 
Problem Statement  
The United States Environmental Protection Agency has carried out many federal 
voluntary environmental programs (VEPs).  These are often canceled for reasons ranging 
from poor execution to a change in the administration’s budget or political priorities. Even 
strong programs that are deficient in just one area or are unexpectedly terminated can hurt the 
reputation of VEPs, thus weakening an important tool for environmental protection.  This 
leads to loss of resources invested by implementers and partners, highlighting the need for a 
tool to comprehensively asses all stages of a program’s lifespan including design, 
implementation, and evaluation (Arora, 1995).  Since voluntary programs represent a 
relatively new style of environmental governance, little progress has been made on VEPs in 
Environmental Program Evaluation research (Knaap, 1998).   
Need for Research 
The field of Environmental Program Evaluation is growing, but existing models for 
creating strong VEPs are not comprehensive.  A guiding framework that captures the diverse 
program characteristics known to correlate with success is needed.  It must cover the 
program from its initiation to its end, and accommodate the needs of government, business, 
and environment (Boyd, 2011).  It must also be a synthesis of existing program design and 
assessment tools drawn from several disciplines.  While completing a fully comprehensive 
framework is outside the scope of this project, the research and evaluation conducted here are 
steps in this direction.  They should serve as a foundation for future research.  Additional 
VEP evaluations from fields including public policy, political science, management, 
business, and economics will also be needed.   
[4] 
 
Purpose of Study 
This study was intended to help compile characteristics for the ideal voluntary 
environmental program by evaluating a recently terminated voluntary environmental 
program called Climate Leaders.  Successful strategies that could be applied to other ongoing 
and future programs were captured, as well as characteristics and trajectories to be avoided.  
In the short-term, these “lessons learned” will improve the performance of EPA’s ongoing 
and future voluntary environmental programs.  In the long-term, they will help advance a 
guiding framework for designing, steering and evaluating voluntary environmental programs.  
It might even prove relevant to VEP bundling schemes which group together voluntary 
environmental programs for easy access at the federal and regional level, like the 
Sustainability Partnership of EPA’s Region 3 (Mid-Atlantic) Office in Philadelphia. 
Research Questions 
 The research questions being investigated are: 
1. How do you define success for the Climate Leaders program? 
2. In what ways did Climate Leaders succeed? 
3. How could Climate Leaders have been improved? 
4. What circumstantial conditions (e.g. political, economic) are important to the 
success/failure of VEPs? 
5. What inbuilt features (e.g. structural, procedural) are important to the success/failure 
of VEPs?  
6. What lessons learned from Climate Leaders can be applied to ongoing EPA VEPs on 
a federal and regional level? 
7. What improvements are not accounted for in existing frameworks that must be added 
for comprehensibility in evaluating program performance?  
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Definition of Terms 
Program 
 Program here is defined as “a set of staff activities with a defined goal or purpose.”  
The Government Performance and Results Act terms these as “activities” to achieve goals 
and objectives (Pumphrey, 1993). 
Public Voluntary Program 
A public voluntary program (henceforth referred to as a “voluntary program”) is an 
initiative or event that seeks to achieve a goal by means of willful participation.  It is a 
collaborative, non-regulatory approach most clearly characterized by what it is not: a 
mandatory program (Boyd & Manson, 2011).  Voluntary programs are organized and 
implemented by an individual or group.  As long as implementation faculties persist they can 
exist even without active participation, however they will not have a purpose without the 
involvement of participants.  One subset within this category of program is specifically 
dedicated to environmental stewardship.  “Voluntary environmental programs (VEPs) seek to 
improve the environment by encouraging, rather than mandating, businesses and other 
organizations to adopt environmentally protective measures” (Borck, 2009).   
A voluntary program involves activity over a span of time, and stops existing when it 
ceases to be implemented.  A voluntary agreement is fundamentally different because it is 
initiated by a one-time action: two (or more) parties sealing their commitment.  This can be a 
handshake, signature, or anything else that constitutes a willful acceptance of mutually 
agreed upon terms.  An agreement stops existing when it expires or when the parties involved 
revoke their commitment.  A voluntary program can include a voluntary agreement by 
members, but a voluntary agreement does not imply the existence of a program. 
[6] 
 
Voluntary Environmental Program (VEP)  
 Voluntary environmental programs consist of programs, codes, agreements or 
commitments.  They encourage private, public, or nonprofit organizations to voluntarily 
reduce their environmental impacts beyond the requirements established by environmental 
regulations (Darnall, 2005: Carmin et al., 2003). 
VEP Guiding Framework 
 A comprehensive plan for the design and implementation of a voluntary program, 
tailored to address the special goals, needs, and scope of the environmental issue being 
addressed.  It must guide program staff throughout the life of the program from conception to 
termination.  It must also include all of the characteristics of performance and structure 
necessary for success and satisfaction by both implementers and participants. 
Evaluation 
The term evaluation describes different models or data collection strategies to gather 
information at different stages in the life of a project in a systematic investigation of worth or 
merit (Westat, 2002).  The product is an assessment of the results, impact, or effects of a 
program or policy (Pumphrey, 1993).  Evaluations have several distinguishing characteristics 
relating to focus, methodology, and function.  An evaluation: 1) assesses the effectiveness of 
an ongoing program in achieving its objectives, 2) relies on the standards of project design to 
distinguish a program's effects from those of other forces, and 3) aims at program 
improvement through a modification of current operations (EPA Evaluation Glossary, 2010).   
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CHAPTER TWO 
Research Design & Methodology 
 
The primary objective of this research is to compose recommendations to improve 
future VEPs using the Climate Leaders Program as a case study.  Ultimately this will 
contribute to a comprehensive guiding framework for voluntary environmental programs.  
There were three main steps involved in this undertaking.  (See Appendix C, Chart 1 for the 
Three-Pronged Approach).  The first was synthesizing and summarizing existing literature 
from evaluation theory.  The second was reviewing publications on Climate Leaders to 
provide context.  The third was assessing the Climate Leaders program through interviews.  
(See Appendix A, Table 1 for a Summary of Data Collection Methods).   
Evaluation Literature Review  
This study began with a meta-analysis of existing literature on program assessment 
standards.  It focused on evaluative standards for programs that resemble Climate Leaders in 
goal and scope.  The analysis included surveying existing evaluation methods from 
organizational literature, including the resources on the EPA Evaluation Support website 
(EPA, 2011).  Next was researching scholarly journal articles (in the Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management, the Annual Review of Environment & 
Resources, etc.) as well as publications and guidelines by EPA and other relevant 
organizations.  By cross-referencing existing lists of criteria for successful environmental 
programs, especially those focused on voluntary ones, a list of VEP evaluation standards was 
created against which to compare the components and operations of Climate Leaders 
retrospectively. 
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Climate Leaders Interviews 
Information about Climate Leaders was gathered in order to assess the program based 
on the evaluation literature reviewed. This entailed searching EPA websites, publications, 
articles, and conducting interviews with former EPA program implementers (EPA 
employees) and “partners” (participating organizations and businesses).  (See Appendix C, 
Chart 2 for Three Steps to Climate Leaders Evaluation). 
Interviewees 
All interviewees were offered full anonymity (or alternatively, select attribution) to 
encourage candor.  They were told that the information gathered would be presented in an 
aggregate form, without specific attribution or quotations unless explicit permission was 
given.  Each was given background on the purpose of the study: to evaluate Climate Leaders 
for the improvement of ongoing and future EPA programs, and contribute to the development 
of a guiding framework for VEPs.  Their incentive to participate was the opportunity to help 
improve VEPs from EPA and other organizations which would benefit the environment in 
the long-run.  Interviewees were also offered a copy of the final project report. 
Interviews with program implementers fell into two categories.  First were EPA staff 
from headquarters in DC who had most control over the recently terminated Climate Leaders 
program, who provided insight into the intended structure and process behind the VEP.  For 
additional perspective, interviews were also conducted with members of the EPA office in 
Philadelphia.  This Regional office had decided independently to promote Climate Leaders at 
a more local level.  They provided a viewpoint from the “inside,” but theoretically with less 
ownership bias.   
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Interviews with program participants offered a complementary point of view, 
addressing how program intention was translated into action.  Questions addressed what 
value was gained from involvement, if any.  These two interview groups (former partners and 
EPA implementers) were chosen because they were most knowledgeable about the process 
and results of Climate Leaders.  They invested more time in dealing directly with the VEP 
than did the designers or more senior agency Directors. 
A total of thirteen formal interviews were conducted, each addressing all of the 
standardized interview questions.  These played a fundamental role in this study because they 
helped define success for the Climate Leaders program.  Of the formal interviews, four were 
with EPA employees, two of which had worked on the program full time.  The other two had 
helped advertise and recruit for Climate Leaders through a Regional level voluntary program 
“bundle.”  The remaining nine interviewees were representatives from former Climate 
Leader partners, all of whom had engaged directly with the program as part of their 
company’s “climate,” “air,” “environmental,” or “sustainability” team.  Of the partner 
interviewees, two were representatives of smaller businesses and seven were from large well-
known companies.  This category included one interviewee who had previously worked at 
EPA and helped design the program, providing a unique perspective that straddled both 
partner and implementer.  (See Appendix C, Chart 3 for Formal Interviews Breakdown). 
Other initial informational “interviews” that did not adhere to the same standard of 
consistency were included for context or background, but not in the interview analysis 
portion of this project.  These will be referred to as “personal communications” from now on, 
and will not be included in further references to interviews. 
Interview Questions 
[10] 
 
In each interview, eleven core questions were asked.  These were posed to all 
interviewees, while follow-ups for clarifications varied depending on the thoroughness of the 
initial response.  The interview questions for participants and EPA employees differed only 
slightly, and these variations are included with the questions in parenthesis where applicable.  
The core questions from the interview script can be found in the Instrumentation section 
below.    
The interview questions were meant to find out how Climate Leaders functioned in 
practice, and went deeper than published descriptions of the program’s theoretical design as 
envisioned by EPA.  The interviewees illuminate how these programs actually performed, so 
that true faults—especially procedural ones—could come to light.  Without these interviews, 
official analysis and published commentary would have to be taken at face value despite 
possible prejudice. 
Interview Bias and Error 
A major strength of this research was the objectivity of analysis; it was not authored 
by an EPA affiliate or former partner.  However, while there was no prejudice on the part of 
the researcher, there were a few areas of potential error inherent in the study due to time and 
resource constraints.   
First, constraints on time and finances limited the number of interviews to the point 
that statistical trends could not be extracted.  It was not possible to interview a random 
sample of Climate Leader implementers and participants, as only those parties that responded 
to email solicitation were interviewed and included in analysis.  Thus the sample was 
somewhat self-selected.  This can lead to sampling error: the probability that if another 
sample of the same size were drawn, different results might be obtained (Sudman, 1976).  It 
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was also not possible to conduct enough interviews to achieve statistical significance due to 
time and financial constraints.   
Second, while it is true that larger samples would have reduced sampling error, 
sampling error is the smallest of the three components of error that affect the soundness of 
sample designs (Westat, 2002).  Two other errors—sample bias (primarily due to loss of 
sample units) and response bias (responses or observations that do not reflect “true” 
behavior, characteristics or attitudes)—are more likely to jeopardize validity of findings 
(Westat, 2002).   
There were two main forms of sample bias present.  One was that the partners that 
accepted the invitation to be interviewed were mostly big, profitable organizations with a 
culture of prioritizing environmental performance.  The respondent characteristics were also 
skewed towards those that had the resources dedicated to an environmental representative or 
team.  Since these representatives are active in the larger environmental activities of industry 
and business, they had distributed their contact information at conferences and other 
environmental events making them easier to track down.  A second form of sampling bias 
was due to the fact that the VEP partners and non-partners systematically differ given that 
participation in a public voluntary program is optional.  More specifically, firms most likely 
to benefit from a VEP are thus more likely to sign up as partners.  This probably lead to more 
progress than would have been possible if a random sample of the country’s companies had 
been involved.  “Large firms, greener firms, or firms with good management may have been 
more likely to participate for a variety of reasons.  If these factors are independently related 
to outcomes (as they probably would be), the partner sample will be biased” (Boyd & 
Manson, 2011).   
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Finally, interviewees may have had their own reasons to be interviewed affecting 
their willingness to be involved in the study, and the content of their responses.  For example, 
this project may have been seen by a company as an opportunity for positive press, or as an 
opportunity to get in the good graces of the EPA.  This also extended to EPA employees who 
had the desired to represent their Agency well.  These motivations may have lead to an 
overstatement of program benefits, thus skewing results (Boyd & Manson, 2011).   
Researchers may not know all of the relevant characteristics that can distinguish 
between the treatment and comparison groups, however, and even if they could, some key 
factors (like a firm’s motivation to innovate, or the presence of a dynamic leader to 
implement changes) may be impossible to measure.  The effort to develop a complete set of 
control variables creates extensive data demands, particularly for a VEP that address more 
than one sector (Boyd & Manson, 2011).  Future analysis should account for these biases, 
especially in a quantitative study.    
Despite all of the constraints and potential distortion, it was worth sacrificing the 
randomness and pure impartiality of the sample to get as much information as possible from 
those groups available.  As this was a qualitative investigation, it was most interested in 
locating information-rich cases for study in depth, not necessarily in statistically valid yield 
(Westat, 2002).  Purposeful sampling was practiced instead of a random sample or a stratified 
sample of a project’s participants in this evaluation.  It focused on the higher tier achievers 
admitted to the program, on those participants who had a basis of comparison from having 
participated in similar programs, and those from a variety of business sizes. 
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Interview Analysis  
Qualitative analysis methods were used in this research, so statistical significance and 
randomness were not as critical as they would have been in a quantitative study.  Considering 
the time and resource constraints on the project, this design focused on revealing information 
about the successes and weaknesses of the program.  In-depth descriptions were the goal, as 
opposed to a statistically significant number of totally standardized responses.  Interviewees 
were given time to reflect and space to elaborate so that unique insights would arise from the 
natural train of thought of the interviewee.  This organic exploration would likely have been 
impossible with shorter more pointed questions requiring responses that were easier to 
quantify. 
The interview questions examined personal experiences with Climate Leaders, with 
the intention of eliciting as much candor from the interviewees as possible.  The questions 
were designed to define success in the context of voluntary environmental programs, and 
probed for perceptions of Climate Leaders—successes and shortcomings—from different 
angles.  In revealing what was encouraging or frustrating about the program, how each 
question was interpreted and what the interviewees emphasized was just as important as the 
content of the answer.   
Instrumentation 
 The interview questions were drafted to reflect the literature review, and finalized 
according to the guidance of EPA professionals (Laskowski, 2011) who have experience 
with voluntary environmental programs at the federal and regional level.  The questions were 
based on the expected categories in a VEP guiding framework, with an eye to validity and 
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reliability.  The interviews were implemented with consent from EPA employees and 
program participants. 
Interview Questions: 
1. What was your role in Climate Leaders? 
2. To your knowledge, how was the performance of this program tracked during its 
existence (According to what metrics and/or what indicators)? 
3. According to what specific criterion would you personally have judged the success or 
failure of this program (if you were a manager in EPA)?   
4. For Climate Leaders, how do you define success? 
5. What was your overarching impression of the program: was it a success or a failure 
according your experience? 
6. What qualities for success do you think this program exemplified, if any? 
7. If you had to choose a single attribute, what was the main reason this program was a 
success/failure? 
8. What specific qualities for success do you think this program lacked, if any?  (i.e. 
How could this program have been improved?) 
9. Do you think others with your role (implementer vs. partner, from a similar 
organization) had the same experience with this program? 
10. Do you think others in a different role (implementer vs. partner, from a different kind 
of organization) had the same experience with this program? 
11. Anything else to add? 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Findings in Literature 
 
History of Environmental Programs in the US 
The US EPA was founded in 1970 and issued a Congressional mandate to ensure 
compliance with ecologically responsible practices (Darnall, 2005).  The agency traditionally 
relied on regulatory programs to compel individuals and organizations (Borck, 2009), but 
struggled to monitor through inspections and audits against budget cuts and limited funding 
allocated by Congress.  Critics of the regulatory style argued that this system was inefficient 
at achieving environmental improvements.  They pointed to media divisions—air, water, 
waste, etc.—and the ensuing fragmentation of efforts (Darnall, 2005).   
One way to address these concerns was through voluntary environmental programs.  
VEPs are collaborative arrangements between firms, regulators, or other third parties in 
which firms voluntarily commit to actions that improve the natural environment (Delmas, 
2001).  The appeal of voluntary environmental programs lies largely in their flexibility, and 
in their potential to mutually serve government, industry and environmental interests 
(Steelman, 2006).  VEPs encourage rather than mandate businesses and other organizations 
to adopt environmentally protective measures (Borck, 2009).  They rely on a “carrot” instead 
of a “stick” approach, spurring commitment to program goals by offering incentive and 
market-based initiatives as opposed to regulations.  They utilize benefits to reward 
intentional and unintentional over-compliance which reduces enforcement needs.  This 
allows for more holistic approaches with lower administrative costs than would otherwise be 
possible (Pizer, 2008).   
Unintentional over-compliance has been recorded since the beginning of 
environmental regulation.  However, in the late 1980’s and into the 1990’s there was a rise of 
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companies’ intentional over-compliance with EPA regulations.  From the business 
perspective, voluntary over-compliance yielded a variety of benefits and is a rational reaction 
to environmental regulation (Seema, 1996).  For example, there is evidence that this 
environmental stewardship was engendered by increasing public awareness of environmental 
challenges (Arora, 1995).  Companies became greener in an attempt to boost their reputation 
with consumers. 
This increase in intentional over-compliance was accompanied by a corresponding 
rise in voluntary EPA programs (Borck, 2009). It coincided with the administrations of 
Presidents Reagan and Bush (41st) who tightened EPA’s belt, and made it even more 
important for the Agency to cut costs without sacrificing environmental protection 
(Laskowski, 2010).  By the late 1990s, Mazurek’s (2002) estimates suggested that more than 
13,000 companies were participating in VEPs, and this number has continued to grow 
(Darnall, 2005).  EPA has since expanded its catalog to over 100 voluntary programs to 
buttress its command-and-control regulation and cut expenditures (Borck, 2009).    
Environmental Program Evaluation 
Not surprisingly, Environmental Program Evaluation is a growing sub-discipline 
(Knaap & Kim, 1998); evaluation of voluntary environmental programs is a research niche 
within this arena being gradually addressed by academia, particularly public policy and 
related fields (Arora, 1995).  Since conventional principles and approaches to program 
evaluation were developed in a system predominated by command-and-control regulation 
(Arora, 1995), these must now be tailored to the newer wave of voluntary environmental 
programs.  To this end, a selection of studies from the emerging field of voluntary program 
research was synthesized.  There are two important points to emphasize before delving into 
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this existing literature: 1) the aim of this project is to contribute to an evaluative tool, not a 
measurement tool, and 2) the research mentions other forms of voluntary agreements in 
general, but focuses on the characteristics of voluntary programs specifically.   
Evolution of VEPs: Why Some Succeed and Some Do Not 
Daley (2007) used a political science lens to observe US public policy shift from a 
regulatory to a more “Voluntary Remediation Programs” approach.   He analyzed the trend 
specifically in relation to the environment.  He determined that state policy adoption was a 
response to interest group pressure, and had a “ripple effect” on surrounding states.  This 
sub-national shift affected the business mindset in many formerly polluting/wasteful 
industries, which created a more welcoming atmosphere in which EPA could develop 
voluntary programs at the federal level (Daley, 2007).   
Following a similar ripple effect logic, Arora and Cason (1995) reported that the 
characteristics of the target businesses determined participation—and hence the viability—of 
a voluntary program.  They assessed the ability of a voluntary approach to supplement more 
traditional regulatory approaches in these target industries.  The researchers used EPA’s 
33/50 Program as a case study to distill out the factors correlated with participation in 
voluntary programs: technologies, production process, size, 33/50 chemical release, financial 
health, etc.  Based on formulas, they concluded that voluntary programs like 33/50 were 
effective (Arora, 1995).  They believed that garnering private sector participation in VEPs by 
mirroring a competitive market could lead to significant environmental improvement at a 
national level.  They recommended that for best results, EPA encourage intra-industry 
competition in environmental quality by offering substantial public recognition of 
achievement (Arora, 1995).   
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Delmas (2010) demonstrated that substantive cooperative strategies are more likely to 
be pursued by firms that join a VEP close to its initiation, while symbolic cooperation is 
more likely behavior by late joiners.  Although VEP early joiners reduced their emissions 
more than nonparticipants, the study results show no significant difference overall between 
participants and nonparticipants in the reduction of their emissions (Delmas, 2010).   
One reason this occured was put forth by King and Lenox (2000) as well as Rivera, 
de Leon and Koerber (2006).  They indicated that without sanctions, independent oversight, 
and standards, VEPs were not effective in promoting improved corporate environmental 
performance (Khanna, 1999).  This analysis applied to programs like Climate VISION, 
Climate Challenge and Climate Leaders, in which the expectations of industry were met 
through flexible and cheaper environmental protection requirements, whereas expectations of 
the environmentalists and other stakeholders were neglected (Levy, 1997).  If VEPs were 
used to serve some interests (e.g. businesses) to the exclusion of others (e.g. environment and 
community), the authors determined that they were likely to lose their value as potentially 
useful regulatory instruments, thereby impoverishing the already limited governing tool box 
(Steelman, 2006).   
Lyon and Maxwell (2002) also presented an empirical analysis of the efficacy of 
voluntary programs.  They went a step further, creating a construct to organize the large 
variety of voluntary programs and broke them down into three broad types—unilateral, 
public, and negotiated— with corresponding examples.  They emphasized factors that 
determined corporate willingness and ability to undertake voluntary action, and summarized 
the downsides to voluntary programs including social welfare-enhancements and social 
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welfare reductions, regulation weakening, regulatory monitoring reduction, etc. (Lyon, 
2002). 
Borck and Coglianese (2009) also described three different structures for VEP’s: 
unilateral, bilateral, and public.  They reviewed research literature on voluntary 
environmental programs to establish whether VEP’s delivered real improvements, or just 
took credit for existing public momentum.  Their focus was on the ways VEP’s operated, 
citing this as the major factor in their success or failure (Borck, 2009).  Their research 
suggested that “VEP’s with more moderate standards—but with strong enforcement of 
them—will have the greatest overall effectiveness.”  The authors emphasized participation 
and environmental improvement as the two main variables in a simple “effectiveness 
equation” (Borck, 2009).  By comparing VEP’s to clubs with membership, standards and 
side-goals, the researchers extended this metaphor to illuminate some of the advantages (e.g. 
collective benefits) and challenges (e.g. defining environmental goals) as well (Borck, 2009).   
Delmas and Terlaak (2001) dove deeper into the costs and benefits of voluntary 
initiatives when in a competitive context.  They described the origins and workings of many 
programs in the environmental arena, and provided a construct for sorting such programs 
based on these costs and benefits.  They compared two main kinds of voluntary 
agreements—negotiated agreements and public voluntary programs—with a focus on 
organizational design.  The authors also investigated programs that had been bundled into 
larger comprehensive voluntary initiatives.  Finally, they compared US voluntary programs 
to those in Europe to extract international best practices (Delmas, 2001).   
    Darnall (2005) also introduced VEP categories, although his focus on the design 
mechanisms rather than the outcome of the program.  The author’s findings suggested that 
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there are four distinct types of programs with varying degrees of rigor: 1) information, 
assistance and awareness, 2) environmental pledge, 3) voluntary reporting, and 4) 
performance monitoring programs.  The author found that information for differentiating 
among program types was limited, which introduced a potentially problematic phenomenon: 
less rigorous VEPs could falsely signal that their administrative, environmental performance 
and conformance requirements were just as strong as programs with more robust designs.  
Moreover, the lack of monitoring and sanctions in less rigorous programs created 
opportunities for participants to free-ride and receive benefits without satisfying VEP 
requirements.  Darnall warned that unless some means of distinguishing among program 
types is implemented, these issues could threaten the long term viability of VEPs as a tool for 
environmental protection, and the credibility of market mechanisms more broadly (2005). 
Segerson and Miceli (1998) presented another model assessing effectiveness of 
voluntary schemes, but differentiated it by making it predictive.  It was meant to determine if 
an initiative was likely to lead to efficient environmental protection before the initiative had 
been implemented.  This was a very simple model helpful in determining not only the 
effectiveness of the voluntary agreement predicted, but also whether a voluntary agreement 
was even the likely outcome of a given interaction between a company and a regulating 
body.  “Polluters” were grouped depending on if they reacted to a “stick” or a “carrot” 
alterative program.  Results depended on various factors: allocation of bargaining power, 
magnitude of background threat, social cost of funding (Segerson, 1998).  This model applied 
just as well to programs as to other forms of “agreements.”   
Pizer, Mogenstern, and Shih (2008) kept a narrow focus, looking at voluntary climate 
programs in the US.  They investigated the participation of manufacturing firms in EPA’s 
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Climate Wise program and the US Department of Energy’s Voluntary Reporting of 
greenhouse gas program.  The authors analyzed whether the results of either program had a 
real environmental impact, for how long, and why.  By the metrics used in this study, the 
programs had modest—albeit statistically significant—impacts on fuel costs and electricity 
costs respectively, and only for a short time.  The authors explain, however, that their 
methodology was limited by the youth and complexity of the field (Pizer, 2008). 
Delmas and Keller (2005) also dove more deeply into a narrow topic: the Free Rider 
problem, a potentially major threat to the voluntary programs of interest.  They investigated 
the WasteWise program to determine what factors (original motivation to enter the voluntary 
program, characteristics of the organization, etc.) encouraged or discouraged a particular 
behavior (Delmas, 2005).   
Economic Considerations: Program Features, Company Finance, Market Conditions 
There are three different dimensions on which economic factors weighed into the 
performance and results of a voluntary environmental program.  The first was on the program 
level.  Alberini and Segerson (2002) measured voluntary initiatives against traditional 
mandatory approaches (regulation or tax), taking into account market effects.  They tracked 
the evolution of voluntary approaches to environmental protection through an economic lens 
by breaking the many voluntary agreements down into three broad categories: industry self-
regulation, bilateral agreement, and government program.  They laid out conditions for 
success in each category, using environmental effectiveness (participation/incentive and 
pollution abatement) and relative efficiency (cost and environmental quality) as measures.  
They identified voluntary program features key to efficiency: polluter choice, flexibility and 
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increased communication between industry and regulator.  Conversely, a lack of enforcement 
and abatement above the norm were potential disadvantages (Alberini, 2002).  
The second level on which economic factors weighed into the success of a VEP was 
through company features.  Work by Khanna and Damon (1999) attempted to determine 
what factors encouraged VEP membership on this level.  They concentrated on 
characteristics of partner firms, a level that they believed weighed heavily into whether a 
business would participate in a program (Khanna, 1999).  These characteristics included a 
company’s past environmental penalties, predictions about future regulation, leadership 
status in an industry’s environmental standard-setting, and calculations of potential 
abatement and administrative costs (Futran, 2010).  Companies are profit maximizing 
institutions, so determining the financial impact of an investment like program partnership 
before approving the expenditures is critical to their survival.  It was important that firms be 
able to design and execute projects with financial benefits, or it would be less likely that the 
required investments would be made (Zatz, 1999).    
There were several routes by which businesses benefited economically from 
participating in VEPs.  One was by leveraging the environmental movement to grow 
consumer demand.  Volunteer environmental programs provided a venue through which 
firms could compete to be leaders in environmental quality.  Companies that publicized their 
efforts to be “greener” earned a reputation for environmental responsibility which is highly 
valued today by a public harboring greater awareness of environmental challenges (Videras, 
2000).  This title was especially valuable in industries that have high advertising expenditures 
and high contact with their consumers (Arora, 1996).  In fact, as public recognition was 
established as a significant incentive for firm participation in EPA programs, the Agency 
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began publicly celebrating of achievers to motivate membership in its voluntary 
environmental programs.  In this way, environmentalism was in line with the ultimate 
business goal of maximizing profit (Arora & Cason, 1995).  Since consumers were willing to 
pay a premium for products and services linked to environmental stewardship, companies got 
a demand-side boost as a reward for participation in EPA programs (Arora & Cason, 1996).   
This ran contrary to the popular belief that environmental management hurt the bottom line 
(Klassen, 1996).   
Another way firms reaped the benefits of joining VEPs was through savings.  Even 
when the immediate impact of program participation was negative due to increased 
expenditures, evidence showed that investors expected such firms to be more profitable in the 
long run (Khanna, 1999).  There was evidence linking strong environmental management to 
improved financial performance (as measured by the stock market) through cost cutting and 
market gains (Klassen, 1996).  Money thrown away on inefficient energy use, water leaks, 
missed opportunities for recycling, over-packaging, pollution penalties, etc. could have been 
saved by exploiting the guidance of EPA program implementers.  Also, market gains came 
from improved trading futures, which start with a consumer’s willingness to pay even higher 
prices to a firm that generates less environmental harm (Arora & Cason, 1996).   
It was clear that environmental stewardship could increase a firm’s profitability 
(Klassen, 1996).  Logically, it would follow that voluntary environmental programs which 
increased demand and decreased costs for participating firms would have greater company 
membership, increased longevity, and thus a greater impact on environmental protection than 
those that did not.  For example, participants in EPA’s 33/50 program calculated a net 
economic benefit from involvement, boosting the VEP’s membership and contributing to its 
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success (Futran, 2010).  These observations lent support to the claim that VEPs are more 
likely to succeed if they offered net savings as opposed to net loss for participant 
organizations.  The bottom line is extremely important when deciding whether to get 
involved with EPA programs, but this is not a straightforward calculation.  Many companies 
determine their success with a longer term measure than a quarterly or yearly statement.  To 
do so, they keep an eye on public opinion and stock markets.  They participate in voluntary 
environmental programs because they realize that their investments in a VEP are covered by 
an eventual payback, and their company’s value and net profit are enhanced over time.  
Much more extensive literature is required to prove the actual impact of a partner’s economic 
costs and savings in the success of federal voluntary environmental programs.  An important 
variable that must be controlled is the larger economic context: whether the country or the 
industry is in a boom or a recession.  The significance of this variable is yet unknown, and 
with future research it may change the entire equation.   
The third way that economic factors affected VEP performance was on the market 
level.  Boyd’s (2011) work took this perspective, looking beyond individual company 
features to assess VEPs within the context of the larger economic environment.  He asserted 
that the most fertile ground for new voluntary environmental programs would be laid by 
market failure—a situation in which regular market forces are not producing efficient 
environmental outcomes.  According to Boyd, greenhouse gas emissions represented such an 
opportunity: the environmental costs of carbon emissions were being externalized.  The 
market was not setting greenhouse gas limits despite the health and long-term economic 
harm.  A government program free of membership charges like Climate Leaders addressed 
this disparity.  It was the equivalent of subsidizing the information, resources, tools, or 
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guidance for participating firms, large and small.  Large firms found it easier to “diffuse the 
fruits of technical assistance within their organizations (e.g., to multiple manufacturing 
facilities)” (Boyd & Manson, 2011).  This implied that a given technical assistance 
intervention could yield large social benefits when applied to larger firms.  Small firms, in 
contrast could arguably innovate aggressively with no need for government intervention or 
VEP assistance.  However, they were found particularly susceptible to “research and 
development” market failures making it difficult for them to create, protect, and enjoy the 
benefits of new intellectual property (Boyd, 2011).  VEPs could provide small firms with this 
security.  Boyd grouped successful VEPs into two categories based on these parameters: 1) 
“programs that provide technical assistance and rectify the failure to invest in research, 
development, and technological innovation,” and 2) “programs that provide signaling 
features which address information imbalances associated with complex products and 
processes, specifically incomplete information that can result in decisions that lead to 
negative environmental impacts.”  He warned against environmental programs that promote 
behavior which would have occurred anyhow, as a result of existing market conditions.   
Boyd’s claim that government programs should address market failures also applied 
to government evaluations of such programs.  Government interventions, whether EPA 
program implementation or the evaluations that follow, were found more difficult to justify if 
there were no underlying conditions that would normally be considered market failure.  
Program evaluations are not easy to appropriate for profit, so they were not incentivized by 
the market (Boyd, 2011).  Boyd found environmental programs and evaluations needed, 
especially those sponsored by academia and government, when markets failed to produce 
them.  They provided information for communicating to a variety of stakeholders, and gave 
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managers the data they need to report to decision makers about the outcomes of their 
investments (Westat, 2002).  This idea of reporting on the outcomes of federal investments 
has grown in prominence over the last several years, in large part due to the establishment of 
the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA).  The GPRA requires federal agencies 
to report on the accomplishments of their funded efforts annually, including establishing 
broad goals or strategic outcomes, performance outcomes, and performance indicators 
against which progress will be assessed (Westat, 2002).  The evaluation of Climate Leaders 
undertaken in this project provided information that the market had failed to supply, and 
facilitated accounting of EPA’s effort in the program. 
This literature review of environmental program evaluation, specifically regarding the 
evolution of environmental voluntary programs, provided many important insights into what 
makes VEPs successful.  It provided a context against which to analyze the Climate Leaders 
program, a step that will contribute to a guiding framework for VEPs.  This tool will improve 
the overall performance of VEPs by taking in the many lessons learned from work in the past 
and yielding a comprehensive guide.  This will boost the effectiveness and efficiency of 
VEPs, and help environmental organizations and agencies avoid repeating serious mistakes 
like prematurely aborted programs and wasted resources.  The evaluation of Climate Leaders 
was a building block for this guiding framework. 
Climate Leaders Program Background 
Climate Leaders was an EPA voluntary program that worked with companies to 
develop long-term comprehensive climate change strategies (Design Principles, 2005).  It 
was started in 2002 to get companies’ carbon management off the ground, offering an early 
standard for tracking and reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.  (See Appendix B, 
Quote B).  To fulfill their program commitment, partners had to complete a GHG inventory, 
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set a reduction goal and meet that goal (McCarthy, 2010).  To do so, EPA guided them in 
setting corporate-wide GHG reduction targets, planning emissions reductions projects, and 
gathering emissions inventories to measure progress.   
The Climate Leaders’ “Greenhouse Gas Inventory Protocol” was based on an existing 
corporate greenhouse gas inventory protocol developed by the World Resources Institute and 
the World Business Council for Sustainable Development.  Through collaboration between 
industry, government, and non-governmental organizations, the World Resources Institute 
and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development produced widely accepted 
accounting practices for measuring and reporting corporate greenhouse gas emissions.  Their 
“GHG Protocol” Corporate Standard consisted of a corporate accounting and reporting 
standard and calculation tools (EPA Design Principles, 2005).   
According to EPA implementers, the success of Climate Leaders relied on highly 
engaged partners moving through program at good speed, submitting data in timely fashion 
(Anonymous #1, 2011).  EPA tracked the program’s process by the number of 1) partners 
signed up, 2) inventories submitted, and 3) goals approved by EPA (Anonymous #2, 2011).  
By reporting inventory data to EPA, partners created a lasting record of their 
accomplishments and identified themselves as corporate environmental leaders.  Climate 
Leaders could also help strategically position partners for unfolding climate change policy 
(EPA Design Principles, 2005).  The hope was that this program would allow partners to 
broaden their emissions reduction plan and align their priorities in other areas to be more 
environmentally responsible (Anonymous #1, 2011).   
Climate Leader partners committed to (EPA Design Principles, 2005): 
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 Developing a corporate-wide GHG inventory of all sources of the six major 
gases (CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, and SF6) using the Climate Leaders GHG 
Inventory Protocol  
 Setting an aggressive corporate-wide GHG emissions reduction goal to be 
achieved in the subsequent 5-10 years  
 Developing a corporate GHG inventory management plan 
 Annually report inventory data and document progress towards their reduction 
goal 
 Publicize their participation, reduction pledge, and accomplishments achieved 
through the program  
In return, EPA provided (EPA Design Principles, 2005): 
 Recognition 
 Press events 
 Articles and public service announcements in business and trade 
publications 
 Speaking engagements at industry conferences 
 Case studies highlighting Partner achievements 
 Technical Assistance 
 Developing a GHG inventory 
 Reviewing inventory management plan 
 Setting a GHG reduction goal 
 Exchanging with peers through Climate Leaders Partner meetings 
 Credibility 
 A credible, transparent GHG reporting mechanism that will develop with 
the science 
 Assurance that Partners have created a high-quality GHG management 
process 
Climate Leaders Termination Letter 
In September of 2010, EPA announced that it would “phase down services the agency 
offers under its Climate Leaders program over the coming year and encourage participating 
companies to transition to state or non-governmental programs” (McCarthy, 2010).  
According to the termination letter sent to partners, the transition would “allow the agency to 
realign resources to better assist companies in learning from the emissions data collected 
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under the GHG Reporting Program” (McCarthy, 2010).  In other words, EPA terminated the 
program because it wanted to put its time and money elsewhere.   
The letter said that among EPA’S reasons for this decision were that other new 
regulatory and voluntary programs existed that address greenhouse gas emissions.  These 
include EPA’s Green Power Partnership, ENERGY STAR, and other members of its climate 
Protection Partnership.  Finally, the letter pointed to the multiple states and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) offering climate programs that EPA claimed were now 
robust enough to serve companies’ greenhouse gas management needs.  For example, many 
large firms were already members of the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and The Climate 
Registry (TCR), two alternative voluntary greenhouse gas reduction programs.  What percent 
of former Climate Change partners will continue GHG reduction activities is yet to be seen.  
EPA promised to look for new ways to promote, support and recognize climate leadership.  It 
even noted the US’s first mandatory greenhouse gas reporting rule that took effect on January 
1, 2010 as evidence of the importance of GHG reduction to the Agency (EPA Press Release, 
2010).   
According to interviewees in this study, the decision to end Climate Leaders was 
made without input from those at EPA actually managing the day-to-day activities of the 
program.  Climate Leaders staff was reassigned to other programs that did not necessarily 
deal directly with greenhouse gas emissions (Anonymous #2).  Since the program team was 
the bridge to partners, this meant no word was passed on to companies participating in the 
program until September 2010 when they received the termination letter.  That was just one 
month before the annual meeting.  Former partners were so surprised and outraged at the 
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untimely notification that they attested to keeping their plane tickets to the meeting just so 
they could “yell at EPA in person.”   
Why Was Climate Leaders Canceled and What Were the Effects 
The end of Climate Leaders was met with frustration and confusion by many 
corporate partners that had invested in meeting program requirements.  (See Appendix B, 
Quote D).  EPA gave one explanation for its decision to end the program: a desire to re-
allocate resources where they were more needed and could be more efficiently used.  What 
went unspoken were the reasons for the underlying change in perspective and shift in 
priorities.  From interviews, several insights came to light about the consequences of a 
leadership change at the top, and many ways in which the program termination could have 
been handled better. 
Several anonymous sources reported their impression that with the change from 
Bush’s administration to Obama’s, there was a new emphasis on environmentalism and 
reinvigoration of EPA.  Climate Leaders had been considered by some as too industry 
friendly, and they demanded a more equally beneficial symbiosis between the public and 
private sector (Dunn, 2011).  To the new administration, addressing this complaint meant 
empowering EPA to use the “stick” of regulation instead of the “carrot” of voluntary 
programs.  The subsequent dismantling of federal environmental voluntary programs was 
interpreted by many companies as a desire by the new administration to show a new 
“tougher” stance on environmental issues.  Unfortunately, turning to a more traditional 
regulatory approach also meant sacrificing the many benefits of VEPs.  These ranged from 
lower administrative costs than regulatory alternatives, to stronger relationships (and 
knowledge sharing) between industry and government.  According to some interviewees, 
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Climate Leaders was much better than regulation at gather information about GHG emissions 
on behalf of government and industry, and with the right amount of effort.  These former 
partners claimed that the new regulation will be more focused on catching offenders than 
working with companies to improve their practices.  This shift will be difficult for large 
companies as they can be cumbersome and have trouble adjusting to the new rules.  It will 
also be difficult for small companies since they have limited resources to help them adapt to 
such changes. 
This study yielded several ways that program termination process could have been 
improved to ease this transition.  One was by earlier and clearer communication to partners 
about decisions that would directly affect the private sector.  A second was even more 
fundamental: incorporating an “exit strategy,” or planned ending, into program design from 
the beginning.  Climate Leaders was developed by EPA, an agency that mostly focuses on a 
regulatory approach that is usually long term.  VEPs like Climate Leaders, however, are 
public-private partnerships; something altogether different from traditional mandatory rules 
and enforcement methods.  Instead, VEPs are approached more like business ventures.  In the 
business world, such undertakings would have a startup phase, a money-making phase, and 
then an exit strategy.  EPA would do well to follow this model for VEPs.  They should plan 
for an initial design and “gear up” phase, a performance metric-gathering phase, and an exit 
strategy (Dunn, 2011).  This would give program implementers EPA the time and ability to 
adequately prepare for the end, and to help partners do the same.   
Existing Lessons from EPA VEPs 
EPA experience with other VEPs yielded valuable lessons which the Agency applied 
to Climate Leaders with varying degrees of success.  First, EPA learned how important it was 
to protect and elevate its programs’ “brand name.”  If a VEP is backed up by rigorous and 
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successful environmental stewardship, the public will have positive associations with the 
program’s name.  Company membership in that program will then carry more value, 
increasing participation.  (See Appendix B, Quote A).  One example of successful branding 
is ENERGY STAR, arguably EPA’s most successful VEP.  ENERGY STAR encourages 
energy efficient buildings and products by offering partners (participants) a label for 
performance.  The program has developed a reputation for results among consumers, so 
membership became highly coveted by industry.  Over time, it evolved an intricate hierarchy 
of merits that culminates in a yearly ENERGY STAR Awards night.  Today, the ENERGY 
STAR label is recognized by 84% of Americans according to EPA statistics, and is a symbol 
for financial savings through energy efficiency.  In the case of Climate Leaders, companies 
that wanted to turn a new “green leaf” for the benefit of the environment or to impress 
consumers were able to associate with EPA through their membership.  Former partners 
reported that learning how to be a greener company in their manufacturing operations helped 
secure them more contracts and make their employees happier.  They felt this offered them a 
leg above their competition (Anonymous #2, 2011).  Climate Leaders did celebrate partner 
achievements and provided public recognition, which helped establish its brand power.  
However, it was not as successful as ENERGY STAR at marketing itself as a premium 
“brand name” program.   
The brand name idea was leveraged even less by EPA’s Performance Track.  This 
flagship VEP encouraged general environmental stewardship, lumping together high and 
low-achieving participants.  Unfortunately, this lack of merit distinction degraded the value 
of membership in the program and in 2010, the program was ultimately terminated.  
Performance Track did get many things right, like relying heavily on Regional-level 
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involvement.  This is the second lesson that EPA should have learned and applied; Climate 
Leaders would have done well to branch out of headquarters in this way.  Unfortunately, its 
staff was small and centralized at EPA headquarters with minimal outreach to Regional 
offices (Jones, 2011).  Still, with only 4 full-time staff members handling Climate Leaders 
implementation at any given time, it was a remarkably effective and well-regarded initiative 
until it was ended in 2010 (Anonymous #2, 2011).    
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Discussion of Study 
 
Format 
The primary research in this study was a “process” and “outcome” evaluation of 
EPA’s Climate Leaders Program.  (See Appendix A, Table 2 for Overview of the Evaluation 
Process).  Progress and impact of the VEP were analyzed through a literature review and 
interviews.  Recording and presenting results in a qualitative form allowed for richer 
descriptions about program activities, context, participant behaviors, and stakeholder 
experiences than would have a quantitative approach (Bond, 1997).  The information 
harvested was in a format that was geared towards policy makers and program implementers, 
to help them inform ongoing and future EPA programs.  It was analyzed and sorted into 
recommendations meant to help standardize program expectations and design for a more 
holistic approach to environmental stewardship on a national—someday international—scale.   
Objectives 
To contribute to the field of environmental program evaluations, the 
recommendations emanating from this study are meant to do two things.  First and foremost, 
the recommendations advance a comprehensive guiding framework for VEPs that will 
require combining the efforts of program evaluators from many disciplines, assessing all 
stages of program lifecycle.  Today’s program evaluation measures the success of a program, 
communicates its strengths and advantages, identifies potential improvements, and ideally 
redirects resources to ensure effective use (Pumphry, 1993).  It can facilitate program 
management by helping identify particularly successful aspects of projects and programs, so 
managers can choose to divert resources to these more productive activities (Bond, 1997).  
Evaluation may also identify external or exogenous factors that hinder program success.  The 
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guiding framework being advanced by this study will go a step further than the traditional 
program evaluations.  It will assist environmental organizations and agencies in creating 
more efficient and effective VEPs, and thus avoiding premature cancellation of voluntary 
programs and squandering of resources.  On a larger scale, however, it will actually help 
enhance existing programs by identifying redundancies, fill in gaps, and increase the overall 
efficiency of agencies that will no longer be forced to evaluate their programs only 
retrospectively.  Due to its collaborative nature, the finished guiding framework will have 
been be vetted by all stakeholders including industry, government, and environmentalists to 
add legitimacy.  It will model all of the key features common to successful VEPs from 
inception to completion, and will serve as a foundation, manual and modifiable blueprint.  
The framework will ultimately contribute to a more holistic approach to VEPs by which 
agencies and organizations can improve design and process proactively.  Such progress will 
move the entire field of environmental program evaluations forward into a new era. 
Second, this study sheds light on the shortcomings of VEPs like Climate Leaders, and 
help ensure that those under construction are built more soundly.  While observations were 
based on a single program, recommendations may also apply to other voluntary program 
“bundles” (like the Sustainability Partnership in Region 3) and similar voluntary schemes in 
other regions.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Recommendations 
 
Results of Climate Leaders Evaluation 
The standardized interview used in this project was meant to determine whether an 
interviewee felt that Climate Leaders was successful overall, and why or why not.  The 
questions were intended to draw out specific characteristics of a VEP that contributed to this 
impression, but the open-ended design of the questions allowed space for elaboration into 
unplanned areas of insight.  The information from this analysis was originally expected to 
yield very specific information about the structure of a successful VEP:  
 ideal size (number of participant entities from the public) 
 scope (types of organizations participating) 
 assistance/support system (provided to participants) 
 time-line (of program overall, and for benchmark goals throughout) 
 management style (used by EPA’s implementation staff) 
 incentive structure (for participant involvement).   
However, the research and interviews did not produce such specific targeted answers.  This is 
because traits like ideal scope and size depend upon the program’s unique environmental 
arena and targets therein.  It turned out that VEP structures varied depending on whether they 
are tackling environmental challenges of local, regional, national or even global scale.  
Instead, the interviews in this project yielded more basic information about the core qualities 
of a successful program. (See Appendix C, Chart 4 for Climate Leaders Evaluation Results).   
These design, process, and implementation results revealed lessons and warnings for 
ongoing and future programs.  Answers to research questions numbers one through three 
focus on Climate Leaders and other similar ongoing VEPs.  These are more likely to have 
narrow applicability: federal VEPs addressing one specific environmental problem. The other 
answers (to questions three through seven below) contain recommendations that will be 
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helpful more broadly: to any organization running VEPs, with no specific scope and size.  By 
comparing and contrasting the responses of partners and implementers, many common trends 
and sentiments were observed as well as a handful of differences.  When compiled, they 
answered the main research questions posed in Chapter 1: 
1. How do you define success for the Climate Leaders program? 
Success for Climate Leaders was defined by its ability to satisfy both industry 
(partners) and government/environmentalists (EPA).  From the perspective of the private 
sector, VEPs are considered successful if they offer the company net savings as opposed 
to net loss for participant organizations (Futran, 2010).  For EPA, success means using 
taxpayers’ money efficiently to protect the environment and human health.  This 
ultimately requires achieving a deep enough bend in the greenhouse gas emissions 
trajectory to make a positive impact on climate change.   
2. In what ways did Climate Leaders succeed?  
From the partners’ perspective, Climate Leaders was successful because they received: 
 free technical assistant  
 easy-to-use tools and structure to inventory GHG, set goals, and reach them 
 standardized protocol for calculating/managing GHG  
 simplified federal rules surrounding GHG emissions (and preparation for pending 
regulation) 
 a relationship with EPA 
 significant knowledge-sharing among partners  
 instant credibility associated with EPA programs, which made the VEP a better 
value proposition in making the case for involvement to higher management 
 benefits to most partner companies’ bottom lines 
 public recognition for achievements 
 relatively short-term payback (financial and/or reputational) on investments 
 
From EPA’s perspective, the success of Climate Leaders was reached because it:  
 did a lot on a small budget (high level program with small staff) 
 helped make climate change an issue that the business world understood and 
addressed 
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 high number of engaged participants representing a significant portion of US 
GHG emissions 
 helped ensure emission reduction measures were reported accurately 
 set program goals high enough to merit public respect, but achievable enough for 
companies to agree to public disclosure and inventory preparation 
 encouraged ambitious partner goals and high partner investment in abatement 
efforts 
 allowed EPA to engage climate change at some level of during an administration 
that was reticent to regulate industry  
 contributed to significant GHG emissions reduction on a national scale 
 
3. How could Climate Leaders have been improved? 
 Progressively higher membership standards so that the program maintains 
credibility, and recognition is more meaningful 
o Moving from normalized goals to absolute goals sooner 
o Differentiation between high and low participant achievements  
 A greater line of communication open for partner feedback 
o Meeting more often to bolster the government/industry relations 
o Faster response time from consultants 
 Better outreach to recalcitrant companies 
 More value added for complex manufacturing firms (as opposed to catering more 
to commercial firms) 
 Greater EPA headquarter outreach to EPA regional offices 
 More dynamic annual analysis to determine what collected metrics say about 
program progress and results 
 Plan for the entire life of program mapped out up front and shared with partners, 
including milestones, ending, and replacement initiatives 
 
4. What circumstantial conditions (e.g. political, economic) are important to the 
success/failure of VEPs? 
 
 Evidence of a major/urgent environmental problem needing to be addressed (e.g. 
climate change) 
 Likelihood of pending environmental regulation  
o VEP that addresses anticipated requirements 
o Relationship of VEP to agency creating pending regulation 
 Administrators that support voluntary approaches 
o Sufficient federal funding for environmental initiatives 
o Sufficient staff dedicated to the VEP 
 A market receptive to green companies, including both consumers and executives 
 Unexpected termination by higher management 
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5. What inbuilt features (e.g. structural, procedural) are important to the success/failure 
of VEPs? 
 
 Strong leadership 
o Credibility of organization or agency implementing 
o Well-trained implementation staff 
 Soundly structured program  
o Well-known “gold standard” protocol as foundation for program (e.g. 
GHG protocol in Climate Leaders) 
o Sufficient resources (staff, funds, expertise, time, etc.) 
 Large/growing membership of participants representing major portion of problem 
(emission, pollution, etc.) 
 Commitment to significant environmental goals 
 Progress in meeting goals 
o Partner cooperation and knowledge sharing 
 Public recognition and promotions 
 Clearly articulated expectations 
o Evolution of goals to continue pushing progress 
o Exit strategy 
 
6. What lessons learned from Climate Leaders can be applied to ongoing EPA VEPs at a 
federal and regional level? 
 
It is critical to collect data throughout the life of the program, and judge progress 
based on multiple criteria.  These should focus on showing how EPA is managing its 
resources, and also whether partners are showing a return on investments (Dunn, 2011). 
Data should also be analyzed for unexpected outcomes.  “Interaction effects” can 
yield unwanted results, as was the case when EPA’s ENERGY STAR began labeling 
energy efficient refrigerators: instead of reducing use, the VEP ended up increasing 
demand as consumers began purchasing new refrigerators without getting rid of their old 
ones.  The effect was to unexpectedly increase overall national energy use instead of 
reducing consumption (Gillingham, 2006).  In the case of Climate Leaders, the economic 
concern is that energy savings from cut emissions might result in a reallocation of 
expenditures in another area.  Such unintended results can weaken the environmental 
contributions of an otherwise strong program. 
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Climate Leaders was least successful in one key area: program termination.  The 
VEP’s end was not pre-designed or well-managed by implementers.  It was terminated 
from the top down, without adequate notice and input for implementers and safety nets 
for participants.  As a result, partners viewed the termination as premature, unexpected, 
and in some cases infuriating.  This affects confidence in EPA and VEPs in general, 
which could damage similar efforts in the future.  (See Appendix B, Quote C). 
7. What improvements are not accounted for in existing frameworks that must be added 
for comprehensibility in evaluating program performance?  
 
There has been a rise in evaluations that are part of a program from the beginning 
called formative evaluations.  These are not separate from a project or simply amended to 
it as an afterthought, but are integrated throughout.  In the past, evaluations were often 
used to measure performance based only on information gathered in a final, summative 
act.  Such retrospective evaluations were too late to improve the program being 
evaluated.  In formative assessments, planning, evaluation, and implementation are all 
parts of a whole working together concert.  Research has shown that by interacting, they 
yield the highest quality programs (Westat, 2002).  (See Appendix A, Table 3 for 
example of formative Project Development and Evaluation Cycle).  
In an ideal VEP, data analysis is built into the design periodically to examine absolute 
trends, and compare these to hypothetical scenarios in which the program had not existed.  
This data analysis would help program implementers establish sector benchmarks based 
on their unique characteristics.  The individualized point of reference would set a 
foundation from which to negotiate program goals with each partner company.  Such a 
data analysis and benchmarking process is already underway by industry, as described by 
Tonkonogy (2007).   
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Finally, two tests should be included in the framework to test VEPs during the design 
and implementation stages.  First, a “Procedural Test” is needed to ensure inclusive and 
responsible participation in a VEP.  Programs should include industry, government and 
environmental groups to build accountability for the actions suggested and taken.  
Second, a “Substantive Test” is needed to guarantee validity and appropriateness of 
concerns raised by participants (Steelman, 2006). 
 
Key Lesson 
There was one lesson for organizations and agencies running VEPs that stood out 
among the rest: the need for a combination of regulatory and voluntary approaches.  In many 
cases, the discussion about federal environmental strategy has become a battle pitting the two 
approaches against each other.  This argument is addressing a false question.  Research 
shows that neither management style is superior, but rather that each is weakened without the 
existence of the other (Bennear, 2007).  In other words, both regulatory and voluntary 
strategies play a necessary role in effective environmental protection on a national level.   
On one hand, voluntary programs are less effective without the backdrop of 
mandatory regulation than when launched alongside harder laws (Khanna, 1999).  That is 
because mandatory regulation—even pending regulation—increases the incentive for 
companies to participate in voluntary initiatives.  Khanna and Damon (1999) explained that 
“participation in voluntary programs depends to a large extent on the existence of a 
regulatory framework that would impose penalties on firms that do not undertake proactive 
measures for self-regulation.”  Over a decade later, Delmas (2010) came to the same 
conclusion, citing the difficulty involved in using voluntary schemes to induce improved 
environmental outcomes where no sanctioning mechanisms exist.   
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On the other hand, voluntary programs offer the tools companies need to meet 
evolving laws and rules.  Climate Leaders is a perfect example, offering free help for 
companies to get their emissions under control and avoid regulatory penalties.  EPA would 
benefit from a balance of the voluntary “carrot” and regulatory “stick” approaches, rather 
than sacrificing one for the other.  Instead of debating which policy instrument is better, 
efforts should be put towards finding the most effective and efficient combination of VEPs 
and regulation.  Together however, they provide a proper balance of strength and flexibility.   
Limitations 
 
In this project, EPA’s Climate Leader program was evaluated as a case study.  
Voluntary environmental programs literature was reviewed, evaluation theory was 
synthesized, and lessons were gathered for incorporation into a guiding framework for VEPs.   
The evaluation was used to filter out success standards for Climate Leaders specifically, and 
to contribute to a guiding framework for VEPs at large.  This process was not without 
challenges, however.   
This analysis focused mostly on one program, Climate Leaders, so the results were 
not necessarily definitive, comprehensive, nor generalizable to programs of different 
characteristics (size, scope, aim, region, etc.).  The evaluation selectively incorporated 
attributes of Environmental Program Evaluation deemed most fitting to Climate Leaders, 
which may have limited the applicability of the resulting recommendations; they are most 
relevant to American VEPs with origins at the national level.  Additional research is needed 
to confirm whether the trends are reliable, and whether they apply more widely. 
It is important to mention other limitations inherent in these research methods.  One 
that could not be overcome was that the limited literature on how to best design, implement, 
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and evaluate a VEP was very diverse across several dimensions.  First, the surveyed literature 
organizes program categories across breakdowns of different characteristics, and does so to 
varying degrees of granulation.  Second, studies attribute success or failure of a program to 
unique factors, including characteristics of target participants, operations of program, or 
incentives offered by the program.  They also group those factors across varying dimensions.  
Third, regional level programs may be different from national programs in their partnership 
base or employee performance. It was impossible to reconcile these different evaluation 
strategies and variables perfectly, so at times a judgment call is made when deciding which to 
include. 
Finally, even once all of the necessary information to build a comprehensive guiding 
framework for VEPs is compiled, the framework itself will be a challenge to draw up.  This 
is because of the nature of program diversity; a tool to guide VEP design and implementation 
must be broad enough to encompass the many kinds in existence, but specific enough to 
capture the qualities that make them each distinct.  Standardizing VEPs in the future will 
make it possible to label programs to distinguish among the different types (Darnall, 2005).   
Future Research 
 
Future work in this area should collect similar data on other voluntary environmental 
programs from EPA’s headquarters and regional offices, as well as other agencies (e.g. the 
Department of Energy) and organizations (e.g. the World Resources Institute).  Programs that 
were terminated would make informative case studies by providing lessons learned, while 
successful ongoing programs (or those terminated on schedule) would contribute best 
practices.  The more program evaluation results compiled, the more robust the guiding 
framework for VEPs can become.  At EPA, data collection should be standardized and 
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analyzed across programs to be consistent and provide office and agency-wide information 
about program organization, size, and achievements (Boyd & Manson, 2011).  EPA offices 
should develop standardized demand measures that begin with the following (Boyd & 
Manson, 2011): 
 participation rates (number of partners); 
 duration and consistency of participation (retention of partners); 
 public voluntary program resource usage rates (hotline calls, conference 
participation, and guidance downloads and requests); and 
 Evidence of repeat demand  
Climate Leaders was part of EPA’s Region 3 office “bundle” called the Sustainability 
Partnership, so once a guiding framework for VEPs is relatively robust, future research 
should test it for applicability to “bundled” voluntary programs: initiatives which offer 
guidance and access to multiple VEPs addressing different environmental issues all at one 
source.  In addition to Region 3’s Sustainability Partnership, these might include Region 7’s 
(Kansas City) 2010 partnership bundles, and Region 2’s (New York City) Green Team.  
Eventually this research can be expanded internationally to test and tweak the limits of the 
framework’s applicability. 
Conclusion 
A comprehensive guiding framework for voluntary environmental programs will 
serve to arm agencies like EPA against blotched programs and squandered resources.  It will 
allow future voluntary environmental programs to be designed with consistency, executed 
according to industry-vetted practices, and terminated responsibly.  When enough—
eventually all—VEPs are assessed at every stage, they will be at peak effectiveness.  
However, to reach this point, the guiding framework for VEPs must be rounded out by 
additional evaluations.  This study provided one such evaluation of the Climate Leaders 
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program, and recommendations for its improvement.  Similar evaluations and perspectives 
from other fields of social science will help create a robust and inclusive tool.  Once 
complete, the guiding framework will help fine-tune VEPs according to standards vetted 
through evaluations, insuring they are designed with the highest likelihood of success.  This 
will be a major challenge to academia, but will be a worthwhile endeavor.  Such efficiency 
and effectiveness is vital in addressing issues that can be critically time-sensitive including 
air and water pollution, biodiversity decline, climate change, water quality and allocation, 
resource and waste management, and energy efficiency.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
 
Table 1:  Summary of Data Collection Methods 
Research Question 
Data Collection 
Methods 
Literature 
Review 
Interview 
How do you define success for the Climate Leaders program?  X 
In what ways did Climate Leaders succeed? X X 
How could Climate Leaders have been improved?  X 
What circumstantial conditions (e.g. economical, political) are important to 
the success/failure of VEPs? 
X X 
What inbuilt features are important to the success/failure of VEPs? (e.g. 
structurally/procedurally)? 
X X 
What lessons learned from Climate Leaders can be applied to ongoing 
EPA VEPs on a federal and regional level? 
 X 
What improvements are not accounted for in existing frameworks that 
must be added for comprehensibility in evaluating program performance? 
X X 
 
 
Table 2:  Overview of the Evaluation Process 
  
 
(Bond, 1997) 
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Table 3:  Project Development/Evaluation Cycle  
 
 
(Westat, 2002) 
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Appendix B 
 
Sample Quotes by Interviewees 
A. “EPA’s blessing gave a program like Climate Leaders the status of a ‘name-brand.’  EPA 
didn’t realize value attributed by companies to EPA’s processes— inventories, numbers 
and goals.  In some cases, that name-brand was premier benefit.”   
–Former Climate Leaders partner company representative 
  
B. “EPA programs are held to the highest standard because they force participants to actually 
work for their partnership credentials.  Currently, there are too many different 
organizations and non-profits pulling companies in so many directions.  It would be nice if 
Climate Leaders provided the undisputed structure and calculations to address greenhouse 
gas emissions so we could focus our efforts.  If EPA was the leadership standard, that 
would be success.  Climate Leaders was an absolute success until it was terminated.”  
–Former Climate Leaders partner company representative 
 
C. “I’ve heard a lot of people say, especially around October ‘funeral meeting,’ that this is 
last time they will sign up for an EPA program.  These were people who had invested 
personal credibility, telling their company to get involved despite the work it would take.  
They had a stake in the program when, all of the sudden, EPA cut their legs out.  They 
ended up thinking to themselves, ‘Fool me once.  I’m not signing up for one of these 
things again.”  There was more damage done in this way—the way the program ending 
was handled—than EPA may have realized.”   
–Former Climate Leaders partner company representative 
 
D. “I don’t think EPA saw how highly valued certain aspects of Climate Leaders were.  This 
should be cautionary tale for EPA: don’t start a program if you are not prepared to 
articulate that is a ‘sun-setting’ initiative with specific objectives that will come to an end, 
or have a plan to keep a program alive to ensure whoever signs up and helps make it 
successful doesn’t feel abandoned.”   
–Former Climate Leaders partner company representative 
 
E. “I saw work of Climate Leaders not as focus on game changing so much, but on 
systematic process of getting companies to be aware of their emissions and institute highly 
integrated plans to slowly and surely reduce them over time.  It was an ‘evolutionary’ versus 
‘revolutionary’ type of program.” 
–Former EPA Climate Leaders promoter 
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Appendix C 
 
Chart 1:  Three-Pronged Approach to Program Evaluation 
 
 
 
Chart 2:  Three Steps to Climate Leaders Evaluation 
 
Evaluation 
Evaluation 
Theory 
Program 
Documents 
Interviews 
Literature 
Review 
•Voluntary Program theory 
•Program Evaluation 
Frameworks 
•Climate Leaders Documents 
Interviews 
•EPA Implementors 
•Partner Company 
Participants 
Analysis 
•Successes 
•Failures 
•Potential Improvements 
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Chart 3: Formal Interviews Breakdown  
 
 
 
Chart 4:  Climate Leaders Evaluation Results 
Program Strengths    Program Weaknesses 
Well organized: clear expectations and instructions Lacked  predetermined termination date 
Aggressive goals and rigorous requirements  Allowed excessive flexibility and lag-time on early goals 
Committed and skilled staff Consultants not intimately familiar with industries 
Free data help, standardized tools, and framework No external auditing services offered, only EPA audits 
Free technical expertise Assistance too individualized and inefficient overall 
Public recognition of partner success More differentiation among partner achievements 
High standard for membership Goals did not evolve in stride with growing program 
High partner traction/numbers Partners were mostly self-selected high achievers 
Strong partner commitment/engagement Goal-setting minimums not raised high enough 
Industry sharing outside of competitive arena No replacement program to ensure efforts continued 
Feeling of cooperation/“family” among partners Insufficient number of meetings and conference calls 
Gave GHG management in business more value Unsustainable pace/expansion and understaffed 
Partners more prepared for GHG regulation Ended before US GHG regulation went into effect 
National-scale emissions awareness and reduction Sudden end undermined individual/company investment 
Showed how much VEPs could accomplish  Method and timing of termination reduced faith in VEPs 
Work was transparent and robust Analysis/utilization of data/results insufficient 
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